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Executive Summary 
Young men from areas of social deprivation have proven very resistant to current road 
safety initiatives, with Road Traffic Collision (RTC) levels remaining alarmingly high. This 
document summarises the findings of a two year trial of the use of social marketing 
techniques to reduce aggressive driving amongst these young men. The trial was funded by 
the Department for Transport (through the Road Safety Partnership Grant), the West of 
England Road Safety Partnership and the University of the West of England, Bristol to a 
total of £100,000. Trial planning began in 2009, with the intervention running from 
October 2010 through to June 2011.  
A review and research phase informed the design of the intervention. This was trialled 
through a small scale pilot with 18-25 year old young men living in the area of Lawrence 
Weston, a housing estate on the outskirts of Bristol. The intervention departed from 
traditional approaches (fear appeals, educational approaches, or punitive measures), 
instead seeking to use a multi-disciplinary approach led by social marketing principles. 
Such approaches seek to create intervention designs that reflect the motives and lifestyles 
of the audience in question.  
The intervention consisted of the following. First, improvements in driving were sought 
from a bespoke designed course of driver coaching provided by the Institute of Advanced 
Motorists (IAM). Second, In Vehicle Data Recorders (IVDRs) were used for data gathering 
and to provide in-car feedback of aggressive driving manoeuvres. Third, an incentive to 
recruit and retain the cohort, in the form of monthly karting sessions was  used as a team 
bonding device. Finally, co-creation and relationship marketing approaches were used 
throughout the trial, (enabled through the close engagement of a locally based youth 
worker and other team members) such that the trial was tailored towards the motivations 
of the cohort. 
Behaviour changes were measured pre- during and post-trial through a combination of 
data. Pre, during and post-trial driver performance data was collected from the IVDRs. 
These used accelerometers and GPS to  measure aggressive driving manoeuvres by 
identifying excessive lateral and longitudinal forces in the car’s movement. These driving 
‘events’ were manoeuvres defined by the IAM as excessive braking or swerving, and these 
were used as a proxy for poor driving technique. Secondly, pre- and post-trial ‘drive-
checks’ (assessments of driving) were undertaken by trained observers from the IAM. 
Lastly, self assessment surveys and interviews were conducted with trial participants. The 
survey instrument was developed by synthesising selected statements from the Driver 
Behaviour Questionnaire and Driver Attitude Questionnaire survey instruments. Qualitative 
data was gathered through a combination of one-to-one interviews, focus group, telephone 
interviews and informal in-car interviews.  
Results across these different measures indicate, on average, a significant improvement in 
driving behaviour amongst participants who completed the trial. Of most significance were 
the drive-check results, which showed sharp improvements across the key measures of 
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concentration, observation, anticipation, and cornering. These observed results were 
backed up by IVDR data that, when accumulated, demonstrated a sharp fall in ‘driver-
events’ per hour of drive-time through the life of the trial. Post-trial IVDR data (up to eight 
months post-trial data) remained at these lower levels, encouraging the belief that the 
improvements were permanent ‘new habits’ rather than temporary effects. Finally, pre- 
and post-survey responses showed improvement in some attitudinal and behavioural 
aspects of driving.   
An unanticipated, but positive outcome was that several of the cohort signed up for the full 
IAM Skill for Life Advanced Driving Course after completing the project. 
In conclusion, results from all measures cumulatively signify that the trial has been very 
successful in delivering marked improvements in driver skills, and safer driving habits. 
These early results give grounds for optimism that the approaches trialled here could offer 
a significant breakthrough in intervention design to address a hitherto intractable 
behavioural problem. 
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1. Introduction  
Previous attempts to improve the driving of young men from deprived backgrounds have 
had little success. The West of England Road Safety Partnership (WoERSP) commissioned 
the Bristol Social Marketing Centre (within the University of the West of England, Bristol 
(UWE)) to undertake a review of what was known about this issue, with the aim of 
generating innovative ideas. The resulting proposals were accepted for funding by the 
Department for Transport (DfT).  
The project partners 
WoERSP encompasses Bristol City Council, Bath & North East Somerset Council, North 
Somerset Council and South Gloucestershire Council. It also includes Avon & Somerset 
Constabulary, Avon Fire & Rescue Service, Highways Agency and NHS Bristol. The 
Partnership works together to reduce road casualties and promote road safety across the 
West of England area. WoERSP initiated this project in partnership with the Bristol Social 
Marketing Centre (BSMC) at the University of the West of England (UWE). BSMC is a centre 
of excellence that researches ways in which social marketing can help solve difficult 
behavioural problems. 
The project was funded by WoERSP, supported by a Department for Transport Road Safety 
Partnership Grant, with UWE also contributing staff time. The total budget was £99,800.   
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2. The problem 
Despite a significant decline in overall road user casualties in recent years, a 
disproportionate number of young drivers continue to be involved in car crashes. In the UK 
only one in eight drivers is aged under 25, yet one in three drivers who die are in this age 
group. Hence, young drivers emerged as a key priority for WoERSP. 
Literature analysis of road casualty data indicates that there is a close correlation between 
crash involvement, youth, males, and social deprivation (DfT, 2011b:16). Within Bristol, 
post code data, based on STATs19 reports, illustrated a clear link between collisions 
involving young male drivers aged 17-25 from areas of social deprivation.  
This audience was therefore identified as the priority group for intervention.  
A variety of interventions have been trialled, but with varying degrees of success:  
Pre-driver education 
These interventions are normally designed to improve the values and attitudes of young 
drivers before they acquire a full licence. They vary in style and mode of delivery and may 
involve a practical, off road element. Delivery can include theatre-in-education, talks from a 
driving instructor, police or fire officer and will vary in the degree of interactivity involved. 
Presentations may be based on emotional or fear appeals, or may focus on legal issues such 
as speeding or drink driving, insurance, vehicle maintenance and purchase. Taken as a 
whole, evidence for the influence of such interventions on subsequent crash involvement is 
weak (see for example McKenna 2010 ). One reason may be that fear appeals have little 
effect on those most likely to be involved in crashes. Males, particularly those suffering the 
greatest social disadvantage, are better able to deflect such appeals. Either it doesn’t apply 
to them, as they consider themselves to be more skilful drivers, or these approaches merely 
emphasise the element of risk that motivates their behaviour in the first place. 
Pre-driver training may also be counterproductive because it encourages earlier licence 
acquisition and therefore a higher likelihood of being involved in a collision (McKenna, 
2010). In reality driving behaviour is likely to be influenced from a much earlier age, from 
observing parents’ driving, or absorbing attitudes and values from the wider culture. It may 
be over optimistic to expect short term interventions to counteract these influences. 
A rare example of a project that had some positive benefits was the recent Sheffield Drive 
for Life project. 
Drive for Life 
Although aimed at learner drivers, many of the young people involved would already have 
been driving illegally. The project was aimed at 17-19 year olds not in employment, 
education or training (NEETS) from an area of social deprivation and addressed attitudes 
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towards driving as well as skill deficiencies including numeracy, literacy and wider life 
skills. These skills were delivered though road safety and life skills sessions over a ten 
week period. 60 young people completed the course, which included tuition in preparation 
for the Theory Test. 
The project produced positive ‘lifeskills’ results with 50 per cent of participants entering 
either employment or education/training following the programme. The Driver Behaviour 
Questionnaire (DBQ) showed a small but significant improvement in attitudes towards 
driving (Sheffield City Council, 2009). 
Post-licence education and training 
We briefly summarise four recent interventions. 
1. Pass Plus 
This national programme aimed to overcome the experience deficit among novice drivers 
by providing additional tuition in night driving, motorway driving, coping with different 
weather conditions and other risk factors for novice drivers. 
However, the impact of the scheme has been limited. Evaluation by WoERSP, as well by the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI, 2006) has shown that not all drivers received the full 
range of additional lessons, and that some of these were delivered through discussion 
rather than practical experience. Take up may have been skewed towards more middle 
class children, pressurised by parents, who were less likely to be involved in crashes 
anyway. Another factor limiting take up may have been the relatively small insurance 
premium reductions offered by the insurance companies. 
2. Max Driver 
This was an attempt to encourage advanced driver training among “boy racers”.  
Despite the language and imagery used, which was designed to appeal to that demographic, 
this collaboration between Max Power magazine and the Institute of Advanced Motorists 
(IAM) failed to persuade many of the target group to take up the offer.  
3. Great Yorkshire Cruise 
The Great Yorkshire (street legal) Cruise was an attempt to reach out to and communicate 
with high-risk younger drivers and ‘boy racers’ by means of the kind of event – a “show & 
shine” – that is attractive to the target audience.   
Aspects of the event were designed to attract the target group’s friends, parents and wider 
family with a view to having the road safety issues discussed after the event and spreading 
the message by word of mouth. 
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The key message of this event was that road safety awareness will lead to better enjoyment 
of driving in a safe and controlled manner. The event gave an opportunity for young drivers 
to display their cars at the same time as improving their understanding of road safety. The 
event was organised in partnership with cruiser groups. 
According to the organisers, pre- and post-casualty data showed an 18 per cent reduction 
in killed and seriously injured casualties, with a control group showing a much lower 
reduction (Department for Transport, 2009). While not scientifically valid, this result was 
encouraging and demonstrates the possible success of schemes that seek to make 
themselves attractive to the audience. 
4. Green Road/Staffordshire 
This project was also important here as it involved young drivers having “black box” in-
vehicle data recorders (IVDR) installed in their vehicles to monitor driver performance. A 
dashboard display gave drivers instant feedback (red, amber, green events) on their 
driving style. Parents and young drivers could access an online record of their driving 
performance, together with advice on how any identified problems could be addressed. 
The project relied on the leverage of parents as the majority of participants did not own 
their own vehicle. The project claimed a “66 per cent improvement” in driver performance 
(it was not clear from the available data exactly what this meant). This outcome provides 
encouragement for the use of IVDR equipment as both a feedback and measurement device. 
However, given the important role of parental influence in achieving this outcome, it was 
felt that a different approach would be needed with young drivers in an area of social 
deprivation. 
Conclusions 
The projects summarised above provided some useful ideas for an intervention aimed at a 
very specific group of young, socially deprived males. In particular, Staffordshire/Green 
Road demonstrated the value of IVDR as a means of monitoring changes in driver 
behaviour while Sheffield’s Drive for Life suggested that a face to face, group based 
intervention was a promising approach. The Great Yorkshire Cruise also highlighted the 
benefits of co-creation. 
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3. The insights 
Academic input into this project was provided by the Bristol Social Marketing Centre. As 
part of this, a doctoral student, Ashley Pressley (based at Cardiff University), was given 
access to the project, and supported by Alan Tapp of BSMC. This PhD work yielded a 
number of useful theoretical insights. These are briefly summarised here. 
The nature of driving behaviour 
Psychologists have identified reflective and automatic modes of behaviour. Planned, logical 
thinking provides a cognitive platform for rational modes of behaviour. But it is also 
recognised that much of our behaviour is automatic, habitual, sub-conscious and reflexive. 
Previous experience is used as a heuristic – a ‘by-pass’ to avoid the effort of making fresh 
decisions each time a behaviour is carried out. Emotions can also act as by-passers to 
cognitive behaviour: anger or fear often lead quickly to behavioural responses that are 
faster than thought. 
All of these mechanisms are important to understand driving. Our cohort of young men are 
strongly engaged with driving in the sense that they take an active interest in driving and 
cars. They therefore have cognitive engagement with driving. However, in common with 
most people, their driving is inevitably strongly influenced by habits, developed early in 
their driving lives, and quickly settled upon as ‘automatic’ unthinking ways of behaving.  
Finally, they are also likely to be affected by moods, or emotions, that may from time to 
time become dominant forces. Given the specific background of this cohort, anger and 
aggression may be particular priorities for this programme.  
Cultural Capital 
The concept of “Cultural Capital”, as described by the French social scientist Pierre 
Bourdieu, offers a useful framework for understanding the driving behaviour of the young 
men who were the target of this project. Cultural capital refers to the forms of knowledge, 
values and language which confer power and status within society. Driving skills and how 
these are displayed within a group are an example of cultural capital. Cultural capital 
theory would propose that the core skills for driving are accompanied by cultural ‘rules’ 
and ‘tastes’ that are socially created and shared. Thus, how one may hold the steering 
wheel could be construed as ‘cool’ or perhaps worthy of ridicule, according to these rules 
and tastes.  
Hence, cultural capital is just as important for a group of young men from a deprived area 
as it is for any other group in society. Cultural capital has to be learned – to be acquired - 
from somewhere or someone. Driving skills, and the surrounding ‘rules’ may be acquired 
from the individual’s family and community, but may bring that individual into conflict 
with the ‘dominant culture’. Organisations such as RoSPA or the Institute of Advanced 
Motorists (IAM) could be viewed as embodying the dominant cultural definition of good 
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driving. However, such institutions would be viewed as culturally very distant – outside of 
the worldview of the kind of young men we are concerned with here. Indeed, the forms and 
practices of these in some ways quite ‘traditional’ institutions (age, language, dress code, 
etc.) would ordinarily be a deterrent to direct contact. These cultural differences provided 
a significant, and some ways central, challenge to this project. 
One way of conceptualising cultural capital is to present the dichotomy of high and low 
forms of capital. Advanced driving organisations represent high-brow forms of 
consumption in the ‘driving field’ where advanced qualifications are used as a tool for 
conveying status and power amongst likeminded individuals. In contrast, low-brow forms 
of capital are considered illegitimate according to the dominant culture of a given 
consumption field. The driving activities of young male drivers – such as ‘meets’ in car 
parks, car modifications and street racing – sit firmly in the low-brow category.  
Importantly each form of the above capitals has value when deployed within its own 
culture. For example, anecdotes relating to reckless behaviour produce positive results for 
a young man when deployed amongst likeminded young drivers. Relaying such stories at a 
meeting of advanced drivers would not yield the same results, in fact this could lead to an 
individual being ostracised from potentially positive reference groups.  
In order for our intervention to work well, a bridge between the two very different cultures 
was essential. This meant using ‘bridging capital’, which enabled the joining together of 
disparate groups. Narratives of what is considered good driving within the young men’s 
culture constituted bonding capital, but created a barrier between them and more elite 
driving cultures. The challenge, therefore, was to create a bridge between these divergent 
cultures, such that the young men were able to access the skills and knowledge of the 
expert drivers. However, this needed to be done in recognition of the fact that it carried 
‘social risk’ for the cohort, possibly opening them up to the ridicule of their peers.  
The use of social marketing as a way of thinking, and as a process, was seen as key to 
addressing this challenge. A prominent example of this was to understand why previous 
interventions’ emphases on ‘safety’ were badly misplaced. For these young men, safe 
driving was of no interest to them whatsoever – indeed, taking an interest in ‘safe driving’ 
would have been ‘social suicide’ for them. Early recognition of this was important to our 
trial: we ‘banned’ the word safety from our work, even between the management group – 
replacing it with the word ‘skills’ as the core focus of the project. 
Social Marketing 
Our first strategy was to avoid previous mistakes. Traditional presentations by authority 
figures, or dissemination of road safety advice through leaflets, posters or media 
advertising, were unlikely to work with this target group.   
In contrast to these simple approaches, social marketing can call upon a variety of 
sophisticated technologies. In simple terms, social marketing involves the use of 
commercial marketing technology transferred to public arenas for social good. Social 
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marketing uses research driven insights to help create an intervention that is designed so 
that the activity that leads to behaviour change is one that is also very attractive to the 
‘customer’. 
This project deployed a number of key social marketing principles and process elements. 
These included:   
a. ‘Consumer research’ and segmentation – understanding the complexities of the target 
group and how different elements of that group – according to age, subculture, etc. - 
would be likely to respond to the project. 
b. Co-creation and community engagement – based on the understanding that imposing 
a project from ‘outside’ was unlikely to work but needed to be developed in 
partnership with key members of the target community to have credibility. Co-
creation activities built up a strong bond between the project workers and the local 
community.  
c. Exchange – recognition that there were social and personal rewards for those 
indulging in the kinds of behaviour that we wanted to change. There therefore 
needed to be compensatory elements to balance the sacrifices we would be asking 
them to make. 
d. The importance of the concept of “cool” (see the work of Bird and Tapp, 2008) – it 
was recognised from the outset that, for this group, road safety is not perceived as 
being ‘cool’, that is, of symbolic social value. This would be a serious potential 
barrier to engaging with young men, for whom there would be social risk in 
engaging with a project which ran counter to social and cultural norms. These ideas 
created a mentality for the project design that was to prove important in attracting 
and keeping the cohort. The project therefore took account of social meanings 
around driving and car ownership by infusing these into the project design.  
e. Overcoming misperceptions - It was recognised that young male drivers have a 
tendency to overestimate their own driving ability, and were initially reluctant to 
engage in driver training. Social marketing’s emphasis on making activities fun and 
attractive was key in the early stages of the project. 
These components were all used to inform the intervention design. The cohort themselves 
chose the name for the project: Wheels, Skills and Thrills.  
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4. The solution: Wheels, Skills and Thrills  
The project was managed by a team drawn from the major partners: Bristol City Council, 
Bristol Social Marketing Centre, Bristol Advanced Motorists (IAM), and IVDR partners 
Alpha Micro Components (AMC). This management team researched and designed the 
intervention and managed its implementation.  
The intervention was developed organically, based both on academic research and a close 
examination of the existing models outlined above. A coaching element and IVDR 
technology were identified as essential elements at an early stage and so the IAM and AMC 
were incorporated into the management team for their specialist expertise. 
It was decided that the intervention would incorporate the following elements: 
 A discreet geographical area 
 Research based insights and a possible segmentation of the target group 
 A manageable cohort  
 Specific behaviour change elements to address cognitive, emotive and automatic 
behavioural mechanisms 
 An incentive to attract and retain the cohort 
 Multiple, objective measures of any behaviour change including evaluation through 
qualitative and quantitative measures. 
The rationale for each of these is briefly discussed: 
Target area 
A review of the Stats 19 and social monitoring data led to the choice of Lawrence Weston, a 
deprived ward within Bristol, as an appropriate area for this project. Lawrence Weston 
fitted the requirements of the project in that it is a discrete community, a low income area 
with a high number of RTCs involving young men. 
Lawrence Weston is a tightly knit, post-war housing estate on the northwest fringe of 
Bristol. It is an area with a strong local sense of identity, but many social problems such as 
unemployment and family breakdown. It has a predominantly white population with 
relatively low educational attainment. It is one of a number of areas where road casualty 
data shows a strong preponderance of young male drivers. The design of the estate does 
little to discourage speeding, with wide straight roads dissecting the area. There is a history 
of antisocial use of vehicles, including unlicensed and uninsured driving, speeding, 
nuisance from mopeds, etc. 
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Target group size and description 
In the early stages of the intervention an ethnographic study of the target population was 
carried out. This study included observation and qualitative research. The aim was to gain 
a greater understanding of young men in the area, their attitudes and habits in relation to 
driving, to identify influential individuals within the community, and to gain a better 
understanding of how information flows within and between groups. 
This study showed the importance of age as a factor. Younger males (17-18) tended to 
engage in “joy riding” and illegal driving, whilst 19-25 year olds developed a different 
attitude towards driving, often involving boy racer type modifications to their vehicles. 
While the driving style may still be reckless, they were more likely to keep their vehicles 
legal and have a degree of pride in them. It was this group that seemed most likely to 
respond to the project objectives. 
A tentative quasi-segmentation of the target group generated five segments:  
Segment 1: “Acers” 
The Acer is an acronym for Alcohol, Cannabis and Ecstasy. “Acers” are drivers who are 
involved in anti-social and illegal driving activities. These individuals are adrenaline 
seekers using both cars and motorcycles as a way to demonstrate recklessness and 
bravado. They lack the necessary income (due to low educational attainment and low 
employment prospects) required to undertake legitimate driver training but have the 
technical know-how needed to drive a vehicle. This knowledge is normally derived from 
illegal driving or informal coaching from older drivers of the community who are negative 
role models.  
They belong to small groups of likeminded individuals who experience similar life 
disadvantages who provide legitimacy and safety despite the obvious negative influence of 
such peer groups. Illegal driving is symptomatic of a reckless attitude towards life in 
general, minimal parental support and scepticism towards those in positions of authority. 
Such individuals are normally known to local Youth Inclusion Project (YIP) and other 
statutory agencies.  
Segment 2: “Pay as you Goer’s” 
The term ‘Pay As You Go’ was applied to this segment due to their frequent vehicle changes. 
These individuals are often employed but have limited disposable income. They have full 
driving licences but drive low-cost vehicles that often cost between £50 - £100. This 
segment warrant further driver training but frequent car changes render long term 
observation through the use of IVDR challenging. They treat cars as disposable items. Due 
to the frequency of vehicle changes this segment are likely to have incomplete 
documentation (i.e. tax, mot and/or insurance).    
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Segment 3: “Maxers” 
Named after their favourite magazine Max Power, the Maxer segment is typically made up 
of younger drivers (17 – 19) who are new to driving. They own vehicles that are used as 
mechanisms of self-expression and identity creation. Their vehicles are often cosmetically 
modified including bodywork modifications and expensive installations of in-car 
entertainment (ICE) such as stereo systems and loud speaker installations. This segment is 
likely to keep and maintain a vehicle over a longer period of time. Maxers are accepting of 
high insurance premiums which often consume the majority of their disposable income. 
Segment 4: “Petrol Hedonists” 
In contrast to the ‘Maxer’ segment, ‘Petrol Hedonists’ tended to modify the mechanical 
components of their vehicles. For this segment, car modifications are about vehicle 
performance rather than aesthetics. This segment is typically older and employed in more 
skilled vocations leading to a higher level of disposable income.  
Segment 5: “Settle Downers” 
‘Settle Downers’ may have belonged to some or all of the previous segments. However, life 
circumstances or improvements in maturity have led to different choices in vehicle types 
and driving style. As the title suggests, the members of this segment have settled down with 
a partner and may have a family. They could be susceptible to occasional reckless 
tendencies but are generally more responsible drivers, however with a set of driving ‘bad 
habits’ that remain potentially dangerous. 
The intervention targeted segments 3, 4 and 5. Segments 1 and 2 were considered beyond 
the scope of this project. 
Recruitment: A fusion of community engagement and incentivisation 
The initial aim was to recruit around 50 young drivers over the course of the programme, 
in two waves of 25, to allow for the limited supply of IAM coaching volunteers. In spite of 
the incentives on offer, recruitment proved to be difficult and time consuming, reinforcing 
the ‘hard to reach’ nature of much of the target audience. A total of 42 drivers were 
recruited to the programme, many of whom had very difficult backgrounds, and for whom 
any ongoing relationship was difficult. Of these, 32 engaged with the coaching at various 
levels of commitment, and in total 23 completed the entire course. 
The young men recruited for the project had typically disengaged from education at a 
relatively early age, had experience of family breakdown and a history of involvement with 
the criminal justice system. Their driving history reflected this, with large numbers of 
crashes and convictions.  
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Of the final 42 drivers recruited to the programme: 
 9 drivers did not complete statutory mainstream education 
 11 drivers had experienced police involvement with their lives 
 4 drivers were subject to YOT orders  
 2 drivers were subject to probation orders  
 2 drivers had previously received a custodial sentence  
 31 drivers had licence points 
Significantly for this project, our cohort (with an average age in their early twenties) 
exhibited an alarming RTC profile: 
Previous RTCs No of cohort 
0 5 drivers 
1 14 drivers 
2 9 drivers 
3 2 drivers 
4 2 drivers 
5 2 drivers 
A project manager was appointed with close knowledge of the target community. As a 
Youth and Community Worker and a local resident, he had a status within the area that 
gave credibility to the project as well as access to the target group. The reputation of this 
individual played a significant role in overcoming initial scepticism that can prevent 
interventions in such tight knit areas gaining traction. His own relationships with many 
within the cohort proved to be very important in generating a spirit of co-creation of the 
project, with cohort involvement in decision making throughout. From the early stages the 
project manager instigated informal feedback mechanisms that led to ongoing subtle 
modifications to the design and delivery of the intervention.  
Initially, four “Team Leaders” were recruited to the project. They were given a role in 
designing the intervention and used to test some initial ideas, including coaching elements, 
promotion and recruitment. While some marketing materials were produced (see 
Appendix 7), and door-drops were trialled as recruitment media, in the event word of 
mouth proved to be the most effective method of recruitment. The Team Leaders were 
crucial for developing the intervention in ways that would be attractive to their peers. This 
included the title of the project – Wheels, Skills and Thrills. Team Leaders also pre-tested 
some of the elements – for example, demonstration drives by the IAM observers, and they 
were, therefore, able to recommend them to their friends.  Monthly karting sessions were 
also provided. These acted as an incentive for participation, but also as a focal point to give 
some structure, and a social element, to the project.  
Karting events provided an opportunity for participants to socialise as a group and 
facilitated communication between the cohort and the management team. These events 
afforded the opportunity to provide information to the cohort on future coaching dates, 
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IVDR scores, karting times (from previous events) and other general information. These 
events also allowed participants the opportunity to provide feedback on the intervention to 
allow small changes to be made where possible. 
Behaviour change components 
In Vehicle Data Recorders 
In Vehicle Data Recorders (IVDRs) are accelerometers combined with GPS capability and a 
mobile signal, lodged in ‘black boxes’ that are securely fastened to the vehicle. These IVDRs 
identified ‘driving events’. These were occasions where braking or cornering forces were 
outside what would be considered normal levels, as calibrated by the IAM team members. 
These breaches were divided into mild 'Amber' and more serious 'Red' events, the latter 
being similar to an emergency stop or extremely hard cornering. As an experienced and 
competent driver would usually avoid this kind of situation, occurrence of these events was 
used as a proxy for poor driving technique. 
The IVDR device sent real time data to a server, which stored and supplied the data. The 
IVDR black box included a tracker which enabled vehicles to be traced in the event of theft, 
which provided an additional incentive for participation. 
Driver feedback was delivered through an LED light fitted within driver eyesight. The 
fitting was carried out by the participants themselves, enabling them to choose the most 
appropriate location for them within the vehicle. 
Thus, the use of IVDR boxes had a number of roles. Firstly it was hoped that the dashboard 
in-car feedback of aggressive events – if appropriately incentivised – would modify the 
cohort’s driving. Secondly, the IVDR data would be used as the primary objective measure 
of the success or otherwise of the project. Finally, these ‘black boxes’ also gave a 
technological credibility to the project which would enhance its appeal to the target group. 
As the project unfolded it became clear that to incentivise based on in-car feedback was 
operationally problematic. One idea had been to create a ‘competition’ amongst the cohort 
consisting of monthly ‘winners’ awarded to those with the least number of events. 
However, such competitions would thrive on stable environments, and on the ability of the 
young men to adopt a mature attitude to competing with others on a friendly basis. This 
proved too challenging, and a decision was made therefore to move to a behaviour change 
model based more solidly on a (modified) coaching design. This design was agreed upon 
for the full trial, and the details are discussed next. 
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Coaching 
IVDR feedback on its own had significant limitations. It contained no inherent coaching or 
cognitive component that enabled reflective learning to take place. It also focused rather 
narrowly on vehicle handling, providing no opportunity to up skill in key areas of skilful 
driving, in particular, concentration, observation and anticipation of other traffic and road 
conditions.  
For these reasons the project emphasis moved to ways in which it would be possible to 
engage the cohort with driver skills coaching provided by the Institute of Advanced 
Motorists. Here, principles of social marketing were used to help IAM partners modify the 
design of the standard IAM “Skill for Life” package, focusing on aspects of driving that were 
most likely to be of interest to the cohort whilst also addressing deficiencies that 
contributed to their risky behaviour. As discussed earlier, it was also recognised from the 
outset that any coaching would need to be promoted on the basis of driver skills rather than 
safety in order to be attractive. The coaching syllabus was designed to ensure emphasis 
was placed on observation, anticipation and hazard perception skills prior to more 
dynamic aspects such as vehicle positioning and cornering. 
An initial demonstration drive was undertaken with the cohort. The demonstration drive 
was one of the most potent elements of the intervention. Participants were invited to 
accompany a qualified observer (IAM trained instructor) along a pre-defined test route. 
Often the observer would be accompanied by one or two of the cohort offering the 
opportunity for peer-to-peer discussion about specific driving techniques.  
The demonstration drive allowed the participant to observe the style and technical aspects 
of advanced driving. This drive – during which a running commentary was normally 
provided - was instrumental in showing the cohort that the observers could drive 
progressively without sacrificing safety. It demonstrated to the cohort the standard of 
driving that could be achieved if they continued to engage in the training aspect of the 
intervention.  
Coaching consisted of an initial driver assessment (“drivecheck”), demonstration drive, six 
coaching sessions and a final driver assessment. Coaching was provided by observers 
drawn from local IAM and RoSPA groups. Observers were selected for an enthusiasm and 
capacity to empathise with the cohort - a group of young men very different from ‘typical’ 
IAM associates. This required careful selection from a larger pool of observers, two of 
whom resigned after initial coaching as they decided it “wasn’t for them”. IAM project 
partners undertook extensive briefings with the coach volunteers to emphasise the 
bespoke design of the coaching scheme.  
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5. Outcomes 
Outcomes were measured through a number of methodologies. The primary objective 
measure was the IVDR data that measured pre-during-post trial reductions in aggressive 
driving manoeuvres. The next level of measure was provided by the pre-post drive checks, 
carried out prior and after the intervention by trained IAM observer-assessors. This 
provided an observed measure of the effects of the intervention on driver behaviour. 
Finally, pre-post trial self assessments of driver attitudes and behaviours were provided by 
the cohort themselves.  
These multiple measures were assessed for consistency by asking whether each specific 
measure provided similar trends. This technique is known as triangulation, and provided a 
robust assessment of the validity of each data set.  
IVDR data analysis 
The analysis of this data was undertaken by Dr Paul White of the Mathematics and 
Statistics dept at UWE. His complete report to the steering group is published separately. 
The data is based on n = 23 participants described elsewhere as the “main” group.  
Structurally similar data is available on n = 13 described elsewhere as the “control” group.  
The following analyses are based on the data from the n = 23 [although missing values 
reduce the effective sample size in specific analyses].  
The data is recorded over nine consecutive time intervals, referred hereafter as Event 1, 
Event 2, though to Event 9. Within each event window there is a record of the total number 
of amber events and number of red events along with drive duration. The amber event rate 
is the number of amber events divided by drive duration. The red event rate is the number 
of red events divided by the drive duration.   
Amber/red rates for two event intervals indicate whether a participant has improved or 
worsened when viewed longitudinally (essentially producing binary data) but cannot be 
used to directly compare two different drivers driving different cars.  For this reason the 
relative amber drive rate is defined as: 
]1[
][
EventrateAmber
jEventrateAmber  
with a similar definition for the relative red rate. This index is essentially a performance 
measure relative to baseline and is similar to a percentage change. In the absence of an 
intervention effect the expected value of the relative event rate would be unity. 
The data analysed in this report contains missing values. These arise if the time of an event 
is not known, e.g. if time of Event 2 is not known but time of Event 1 and Event 3 is known 
then either a backfill or a carry forward imputed value for Event 2 could be made. Doing so 
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might mitigate against the discovery of significant effects; not doing this may reduce 
effective sample size and result in the non-discovery of effects.     
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Amber rate and relative amber rate 
A count of the number of positive changes and the number of negative changes in amber 
rates between any two events [Event j, and Event k] may be performed. These counts may 
be examined for evidence of a systematic change using the Sign test. This approach using 
the amber rate is defendable as it does not compare rates between drivers and their cars 
but compares changes within a driver.   
The Table below presents the changes in amber rate relative to Event 1 [baseline data]. The 
p-value reported is the p-value from the Sign test and p < 0.05 indicates a statistically 
significant effect.  
 
Table 1: Count of changes in amber rate relative to Event 1 
Event  Improvement   Worsening  Sample Size  p-value 
         
Event 2  7  6  13  1.000 
Event 3  8  4  12  .388 
Event 4  11  1  12  .006 
Event 5  10  0  10  .002 
Event 6  13  0  13  <.001 
Event 7  9  0  9  .004 
Event 8  9  0  9  .004 
Event 9  10  0  10  .002 
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Red rate and relative red rate 
The preceding analyses for the amber rate and the relative amber rate have been 
reproduced using the red rate and the relative red rate. 
 
Table 2: Count of changes in red rate relative to Event 1 
Event  Improvement   Worsening  Sample Size  p-value 
         
Event 2  7  6  13  1.000 
Event 3  5  7  12  .774 
Event 4  9  3  12  .146 
Event 5  7  3  10  .344 
Event 6  11  2  13  .022 
Event 7  9  0  9  .004 
Event 8  8  1  9  .039 
Event 9  8  2  10  .109 
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Summary of IVDR analysis 
Both graphs demonstrate a sharp and sustained decline in both red and amber events 
based on the parameters set at the outset to define desirable driving performance. The 
initial sharp drop in red events precedes the start of coaching and suggests that 
engagement in the trial in itself had an immediate effect. As hoped, the initial coaching 
sessions, including the demonstration drive, appear to have had a significant impact, while 
subsequent coaching seems to have maintained newly established driving patterns.  
Post trial behaviour: more detailed analysis  
The graph below illustrates the findings with respect to post trial retention of the improved 
driving behaviour. Time zero represents the end of the first data collection period. The 
mean monthly relative amber rate and the mean monthly relative red rate for the 
remaining participants is calculated for each of the seven months. The black line (Y = 1) 
represents no change in either the relative amber rate or relative red rate and a position of 
no change would occur if there is random deviation around this line. An amber rate 
warning line and a red rate warning line is superimposed on the graphic. A breach of the 
amber rate warning line for amber or a breach of the red rate warning line would indicate 
that previously obtained benefits had not been maintained and that there was evidence of a 
worsening mean behaviour. No such breaches are observed. [In fact the number of 
participants changes over time and both the red rate warning line and amber rate warning 
lines should be changing step functions; this would make the graphic a lot more complex, 
harder to explain, but would not change conclusions; for simplicity of exposition two 
simple warning lines are put on the graphic.]   
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Dr White concluded that the mean relative amber rate and relative red rate had not 
reverted to past historic values and is entirely consistent with the claim made here that the 
driving improvements created by the intervention have been maintained in the post trial 
analysis period. 
Drivecheck outcomes 
‘Drivechecks’ are visual assessments of driver performance based on observed drives by 
IAM Observers. A test route was designed which incorporated different road types, speeds 
and hazards. The test route was used during both before and after drivechecks to monitor 
behaviour change along a consistent route. 
Pre- and post-intervention drivechecks were undertaken, with scores for each driver 
compared for signs of improvement. These are based on the standard criteria used by the 
IAM to conduct driver assessments and therefore provide a useful benchmark for this 
cohort. In total 22 drivers completed both entrance and exit drivechecks. All but two 
drivers achieved an improvement in their scores, with the average score changing from 34 
per driver before coaching to 21 per driver after (lower scores reflect improved driving). 
The potential for observer bias was recognised and hence, where possible, the same 
observers conducted both drivechecks.  
Table 3: Pre-post drivecheck scores for 22 drivers 
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The assessments indicate a clear improvement across the board for the group as a whole 
and lend confidence to the interpretation of IVDR data. 
In summary, the improvement in driving behaviour indicated by the IVDR data is 
corroborated by the drive checks. 
Self assessment surveys 
Surveys were administered at the entrance and exit phases of the project. The surveys 
were stripped down versions of the standard Driver Behaviour and Driver Attitude 
Questionnaires. The survey sheet is shown in Appendix 4. 
In total 23 drivers completed the entrance and exit surveys. The results across the cohort 
showed significant positive changes for questions relating to tailgating, braking and 
unofficial “races” with other drivers. There was no significant change in relation to any of 
the other items.  
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Pre – Post Test Statistics
b
 
 
Small 
Gap  
Wound 
Up   
Overtake 
Risky   Aggressive/Fun   
Excess 
Speed   
Above 
Average   
Own 
Capabilites   Style/Who  Annoy/Mistakes   Dangers/Close   
P .022 1.000 .210 .302 .302 .581
a
 1.000 .146 .774 .012 
b. Sign Test 
 
In a similar way, Section B of the survey relates to aspects of behaviour.  Significances are 
observed on Item 7 (Races) and Item 9 (Braking) but not on other items. 
 
 
Test Statistics
c
 
 
Signal/Faster   Recollection  Junction/Cross  Left/Cyclist   
Speed/ 
Oncoming   
Rear 
View    
Races 
Post -  
Wrong 
Lane  Braking   
Z -1.76 -.480 -1.03 -1.41 -.583 -.641 -2.99 -.905 -2.81 
p .088 .631 .303 .157 .560 .521 .003 .366 .005 
c. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Test Statistics
b
 
 
Signal/Faster   Recollection  Junction/Cross  Left/Cyclist   
Speed/Oncoming 
' 
Rear 
View   
Races 
' 
Wrong 
Lane  Braking   
p .227 1.000 .388 .375 .754 1.000 .003 .549 .004 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
b. Sign Test 
 
Interviews 
Interviews were conducted both with participants of the intervention and observers tasked 
with coaching the cohort. These interviews explored the views and motivations of 
participants, their reasons for taking part and the benefits they felt they had gained from 
the project. 
Extracts from some of these interviews are included in Appendix 4. 
Other outcomes 
In addition to these measured outcomes, there were several unexpected, but very positive, 
outcomes of the project.  
In various informal ways, the young men engaged with the project have benefited from 
incidental information, advice and contacts resulting from their engagement. These 
included outcomes relating to housing, debt management, benefits advice, employment 
support, and employment gained through support. The project team noted that the act of 
engagement – with the project itself, and with stable society in the shape of the IAM 
volunteers – helped to engineer a pathway to social engagement for some of the cohort 
who had hitherto found this difficult.  
A more directly road safety related outcome is that, to date, 15 of the young drivers have 
signed up for the full Skill for Life IAM driving course, with 5 of them  having already 
successfully completed the course. This represents a very significant change in the 
aspirations of the cohort and one which they were extremely unlikely to have even 
considered at the outset. 
  
 25 
7. Conclusions and recommendations 
The results from Section 6 indicate that this intervention has achieved significant 
improvements in driving behaviour among this group. Given that young males from 
deprived backgrounds are notoriously resistant to traditional road safety interventions, 
this is, to say the least, encouraging.  
The intervention design fused together community engagement and bespoke coaching, 
underpinned by social marketing principles. The centrepiece of the project was the 
relationship between the IAM Observers and the cohort of young men. It is difficult to over-
state the challenges that this project overcame in bringing these two very different 
communities together. The success of this relationship was attributed to a number of 
‘catalysts’, described in the report. The project’s emphasis on skills rather than safety 
helped to bridge the potential cultural barrier between the cohort and the Observers 
through a shared interest in cars and skilful driving. The careful briefing of the Observers, 
and their own work in redesigning the Skills for Life course meant that they were able to 
act as role models despite the cultural and age gap and were perceived as possessors of 
valued forms of knowledge. The demonstration drives were also catalytic in selling the 
project and bridging a gap between the values attached to driving by the group and those of 
the advanced drivers. The initial engagement of the four “Team Leaders” in co-creation of 
the project and their role in dissemination and recruitment probably helped to lend 
authenticity to the ‘project brand’. 
Behind the IAM-cohort link lay another crucial relationship: that of the Youth Worker who 
was also project manager for the project. His credibility in the local area as part of the 
management team was key. His extensive knowledge and experience of working with 
young people gave valuable insight into the social dynamics of the area and the ways in 
which information was shared. It enabled continuous feedback about the project and 
allowed adaptations to be made as things developed. In terms of the Bourdieu model 
described earlier, the group possessed strong bonding capital and weak bridging capital, so 
credibility depended on a trusted source within the community being identified strongly 
with the project. Initial attempts at promoting the project through leaflets and a You Tube 
video were unsuccessful, even though the four team leaders had helped in their production. 
The local contact proved invaluable in recruiting for the project by word of mouth 
(snowballing), which proved to be the most effective method. 
Retention was as challenging as recruitment. It was understood from the outset that 
securing ongoing commitment was going to be challenging. Other groups seeking to repeat 
this model need to resource retention accordingly: significant energy was spent in securing 
basic commitments and ensuring promises were kept. These difficulties also required 
patience from observers who understood that some of the cohort had relatively chaotic 
lifestyles and could not always be relied upon. We note that despite these safeguards, 
nearly half of the original cohort failed to complete all the coaching elements. Those 
seeking to repeat this model need to clearly understand the nature of the group they will be 
working with and be able to plan accordingly.  
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Backing up these relationships were the technological and incentive components of the 
project: the IVDRs, and monthly karting sessions. These enabled ‘exchanges’ to take place – 
offering tangible rewards in return for participation. We noted that the karting component 
proved to be an effective recruitment tool, however its importance appeared to diminish as 
the project developed. The coaching and the casual socialising associated with karting then 
became more important in maintaining commitment to the project.  
We expect that future road safety interventions aimed at young people will lean towards a 
dependence on private funding, probably from the insurance industry sector. However, 
such models are likely to be based on simplistic models of self-taught driving improvement 
driven by IVDR technology. This may have good returns for mainstream society, but we 
doubt if they would provide adequate returns for hard to reach young males. Given their 
high risk, we believe there is a clear case for a bespoke model of the type described in this 
report. 
 
 27 
References 
Association of British Insurers, 2006. Pass Plus 10 Years On 
Advanced Driving Magazine, 2011. “Reaching the Unreachables”. Winter Edition.   
Bird, S. and Tapp, A. 2008. Social marketing and the meaning of cool. Social Marketing 
Quarterly. Vol. 14, (1), pp. 18 – 29.  
Collins, K., Tapp, A., and Pressley, A. 2011. Social Marketing and social influences: Using 
social ecology as a theoretical framework. Journal of Marketing Management. Vol. 26 
(13 – 14), pp. 1181 – 1200.  
Pressley, A., Collins K., and Tapp, A. 2010. Boy Racers and Bourdieu: Field Capital Theory 
and its Implications for Social Marketers – Paper presented at the 2010 
International Nonprofit & Social Marketing Conference, Brisbane. 
Tapp, A., Baugh, M., and Pressley, A. et al. 2011. The use of social marketing to address 
aggressive driving amongst ‘hard to reach’ young men. Interim Report to the 
Department for Transport. 
Tapp, A., Pressley, A. and Collins, K. 2011. Theory development in social marketing: The 
advantages of an eclectic approach, Paper presented at the 2011 World Social 
Marketing Conference, Dublin.  
Tapp, A., and Warren, S. 2010. Field-capital theory and its implications for marketing. 
European Journal of Marketing 44(1/2), pp. 200-222.  
West of England Draft Joint Local Transport Plan 3 2011 – 2026. West of England 
Partnership. December 2010. (http://www.travelplus.org.uk/our-vision/joint-local-
transport-plan-3) 
Department for Transport, 2009a. A safer way: consultation on making Britain’s roads the 
safest in the world [Online]. Available at: 
www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roadsafety/roadsafetyconsultation [Accessed 3 January 2010]. 
Department for Transport, 2009b (Nov). Road Safety Partnership Grant Round 1 
Department for Transport, 2011a (Sept). Reported road casualties in Great Britain: 2010. 
Available from: http://www.dft.gov.uk/statistics/releases/road-accidents-and-
safety-annual-report-2010 [Accessed 29th September 2011]. 
 28 
Department for Transport, 2011b (May). Strategic Framework for Road Safety. Available 
from: http://www.dft.gov.uk/publications/strategic-framework-for-road-safety 
[Accessed 11th May 2011]. 
McKenna, F.,2010 Education in Road Safety-Are We Getting It Right? – Report for RAC 
Foundation. 
Sheffield City Council, 2009. Report on Drive for Life Project. 
 29 
Glossary 
 
ABI ................ Association of British Insurers 
AMC ............. Alpha Micro Components 
BSMC ........... Bristol Social Marketing Centre 
DBQ .............. Driver Behaviour Questionnaire 
DfT ................ Department for Transport 
G-G Kite……A model of longitudinal and latitudinal g-force. 
IAM ............... Institute of Advanced Motorists 
ICE ................ In Car Entertainment 
IVDR ............. In-Vehicle Data Recorder 
NEETS .......... Not in employment, education or training scheme 
NHS............... National Health Service 
RoSPA........... Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents 
RTC ............... Road Traffic Collision 
STATs19 ....... Collision report forms 
UWE ............. University of the West of England, Bristol 
WoERSP ....... West of England Road Safety Partnership 
YIP ................ Youth Inclusion Project 
YOT .............. Youth Offending Team 
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Appendix 1: IVDR Procedures 
a) Blind data. In order to understand the effects of the pilot, the management team required 
a benchmark of driving behaviour. IVDR units were installed in participants’ vehicles up to 
one month prior to the start of coaching. During this time participants were not given any 
feedback on their driving via verbal coaching or LED outputs. The first drivecheck marked 
the end of the blind period.  
b) LEDs. On completion of the blind period, participants were given the LED loom which 
could be self-installed by attaching the loom to the IVDR unit. Participants were then able 
to see the dynamic parameters on which they would be judged via a LED output.  
Participants could choose where they wished the LED unit to be displayed offering the 
opportunity for customisation. Some of the cohort chose to hard-wire the loom into their 
vehicle, others chose less intrusive means of displaying the lights.  
A short period of experimentation where the cohort would test the parameters of the IVDR 
unit and the corresponding green, yellow or red outputs, was anticipated. 
The IVDR data shows a dramatic initial decline in average red and amber events across the 
cohort. This improvement in performance occurs very early in the intervention, suggesting 
a strong influence from the demonstration drive. The impact of coaching is also evident 
from the maintenance of the initial improvement and a continuing decline in the average 
red and amber events recorded. This improvement appears to have been maintained in the 
six months or so from the final stage of the intervention until the IVDR data collection 
ended. 
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Appendix 2: Drive Check Sheets 
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Appendix 3: Survey Sheets 
 
 33 
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Appendix 4: Interview extracts 
 
Recruitment: 
We have already mentioned the difficulties of recruitment. The leafleting was of limited 
effectiveness. Importantly the cohort grew in number through word of mouth after the 
implementation phase had begun. Once we had overcome the initial scepticism shown by the small 
group, friends and colleagues of early innovators began to sign up and engage with the intervention.  
 
“I heard about it through a friend that was already doing it, I think he had done one session before and 
he mentioned it and it just went from there”. 
 
“Through X, he said about it and Y as well, do you know Y? He was saying about it and I came up when 
he was doing his drive, his first...what’s it called?” 
 
“One of my good friends is on his way down but an apprentice at his work is coming down as well so 
that’s three of us.” 
 
“That’s my mate there...he wants to get on the scheme as well” 
 
“The worst driver that I know…I won’t say who he is but I will give you a little hint, he is here tonight, 
he came here with me”. 
 
“I have always liked watching the advanced driving like the skid-pans and things like that, that has 
been something I have wanted to do.” 
 
“To learn anything really, coz obviously wear and tear on my car, if I am doing something wrong or 
whatever I can be told that is a bit wrong, and I can save money by wear and tear and stuff and the 
fact that it will help the insurance as well, that was a big thing for me”. 
 
“X said you have a drive check and you get to go go-karting and there is loads of stuff they give you for 
free”. 
IVDR: 
 
“I was round my friend’s house, just chilling, playing the computer.  It was about 1130, I had just gone 
to leave to get home and I noticed my car wasn’t parked where I thought I had left it to.  Obviously I 
then realised it had been stolen. They looked at the tracker and they found where it was, I think Inns 
Court, Knowle West or Hartcliffe area. I told the Police the position of where the tracker was and the 
Police went looking and it was where he said it was.” 
 
A respondent later made reference to the swift recovery of the vehicle in an exit focus group. We 
would suggest this would help to overcome scepticism should the intervention be adopted by other 
similar areas.   
 
“Who was it with the escort that got pinched? They got it back didn’t they? You can’t get much better 
than that!” – Focus group – LW. 
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Demonstration Drives: 
 
“Right at the beginning of the project he showed us what they [the observer] drive like.  I thought he 
was good” 
 
Coaching: 
A number of quotes taken from exit interviews and focus groups with participants provide an 
illustration of views about the trial 
 
“I thought the cornering session was quite good.  The positioning on the corners, like if you were on the 
corner just going left, you would stick further out to the right so you could see further round the 
corner.  Things like that, like I didn’t really think about things like that before I did that coaching 
lesson”. 
 
“When I went out for a drive, we pulled up at a set of traffic lights and another car, young kiddie in I 
think it was a Saxo pulled up next to me and X [Observer] said, ‘watch this bloke, he will go speeding 
off at the traffic lights’ and I have gone off normally, drove on normally, he said, ‘I guarantee you he 
will be stuck at the next set of traffic lights, pull up behind him’.  Pulled up behind him stuck at the 
traffic lights so what is the point of speeding all the time?  You don’t get anywhere fast, you just end up 
stuck at the next traffic lights!” – exit one–to–one. 
 
“One handed steering - don’t do it anymore.  Don’t know why! Just, like, always two hands on the 
steering wheel.  Even my uncle went, ‘why have you got two hands on the wheel?’” 
 
“You can read people better now I find.  You see someone is going to do something a long way, before I 
would just follow the car in front of me, I didn’t even see the brakes lights or anything.  But with this 
keep your eyes at high beam and all that, you can see stuff so far away”. 
 
“It just makes you more alert to everyone around you rather than you just drive along in your own 
little world”. Focus group – LW 
 
“I tend to plan more.  They taught us, when you see a cyclist, instead of just hurtling past, try and plan 
it so that as you get to the cyclist, he is in-between, I do plan, instead of ploughing up behind him and 
slamming the brakes on and then waiting to somehow overtake” - Focus group – LW 
 
“I used to go 40 in the 30 all the time but that has come down” 
 
“Rather than taking sharp corners and thinking well “F” it, you know, be more cautious” - Focus group 
– LW 
 
“What’s that view thing called, limit point, when you get to a corner and you can only see 10 meters, 
you slow right down and as it opens up you put your foot down to suit it”. Focus group – LW 
 
“You do enjoy it [driving] more, you don’t mind slowing down a bit in the 30 because you have already 
had a bit of fun [on faster roads] and you don’t mind slowing down” - Focus group – LW 
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“I used to use one [hand] on the motorway, put the chair back as far as you can. I use two hands now”. 
– LA focus group. 
 
“And not going down through the gears, I always used to go down through the gears, that kind of 
thing”. - LA focus group. 
 
“The maintenance as well and things like that, what was it, putting the clutch down when you start the 
engine that takes away so much of the battery when you start the car, things like that.” - - LA focus 
group. 
 
“I think the cornering is the big one really, a lot of people crash on corners” - LA focus group. 
 
Observer Interviews: 
 
“The first lad I took out was exceptional, brilliant, there was only a couple of points I picked him up on 
but I had a really nice run with him, really good”. 
 
“I wouldn’t say they were a danger to me but they were very fast, they disregarded the speed limit, they 
certainly didn’t have control of their cars because they were driving with one hand” 
 
“Of the lads that I have been out with, none have been what I would classify as dangerous, we haven’t 
got into any dangerous situations, I certainly haven’t wanted to stop the car and say ‘drop me here 
and I will arrange a lift home’ sort of thing. The one trait that I have come across with everyone I have 
been out with so far is that they tend to steer single handed” 
 
“…when I was their age and I had just passed my test, I thought I could drive anything, any speed, 
anywhere. As you get older and you get more sensible then you realise there is an awful lot to learn 
when it comes to driving cars” 
 
 
“The young lad I took out last time - he looked at me and I looked at him - I thought ‘you might be 
giving me a bit of trouble’, but once he got to know the way I was speaking to him he was a very nice 
lad” 
 
 
“It does seem to me, they tend to rely on their quick reactions to get them out of trouble which, with 
foresight, they wouldn’t have got into it in the first place”. 
 
“I am still learning after 46 years on the road. There is always something that you can learn, you never 
stop”. 
 
"I had more than a little trepidation getting into cars with these young 
lads - all with a history of illegality and RTCs...as it turned out neither I, nor 
any of the Observer team had any problems - they were as good as gold and 
listened and practiced what we suggested." 
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Appendix 5: Publicity materials 
 
a. Recruitment Leaflet 
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b. Videos 
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Appendix 6: Dissemination 
 
 
 
IAM Magazine Feature, November 2011 
 
This report will be made available on the Road Safety GB website 
